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Abstract 
The purpose of this study are to analyze indication of earnings management conducted by companies, to analyze 
the differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO, to analyze the differences of 
earnings management between IPO and one period before IPO, to analyze the differences of earnings 
management between one period before IPO and one period after IPO.  Because of the scope of financial 
accounting is very broad, the researcher tries to limit on the relationship between IPO and earnings management 
that the company listed on IDX (Indonesian Stock Exchange) in period 2008-2012. From the result and 
discussion, the conclusion of this research war that the companies do earnings management on the year of IPO, 
the companies don’t do earnings management one year before IPO (t-1) and the companies don’t do earnings 
management one year after IPO (t+1). There is differences of earnings management between IPO and one period 
after IPO, and differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO. There is no 
differences of earnings management one period before IPO and one period after IPO. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Background 
Earnings management in the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) process, has attracted attention in accounting research.
 
Earnings management in the Initial Public Offerings (IPO)  process is a particular concern because of the extent 
of information asymmetry between the owners-managers and investors (Leland and Pyle 1977), and between 
informed and uninformed investors (Rock 1986; Beatty and Ritter 1986). Because little information is available 
about these firms prior to going public, investors have to rely extensively on the prospectus for relevant financial 
information.  
The information asymmetry between management and related parties creates an opportunity for 
management to make earnings management. Management also has incentive to engage in earnings management 
to ensure that the issue is fully subscribed because their compensation and/or reputation depend on the success of 
the Initial Public Offerings (IPO). This research will analyze the impact of earning management during Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) in IDX. 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first time a company offers its shares for sale to general investors. 
The process is called “going public.” The purpose of IPO is to share the company stocks in public and also gain 
the more equity to expand the company. IPO in Indonesia happens if a company goes public in IDX (Indonesian 
Stock Exchange) for the first time. 
IDX shall announce the listing and trading of the relevant shares at the latest one working day at the 
latest prior to the commencement of trading of such shares. 
The company that done IPO in Indonesia, usually done increasing earnings management in the time of 
IPO to attract the investors and the one period after and befor the earnings management will be decrease. So 
based on the description above and the research gap, this research will analyze the earnings management during 
IPO in IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange). 
Reseach Questions 
Based on the background, and the different result from previous researchers the earnings management during 
IPO. So the researcher tries to formulate the research questions as follows: 
a. Are there any indication of earnings management conducted by companies? 
b. Are there any differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO ? 
c. Are there any differences of earnings management between IPO and one period before IPO? 
d. Are there any differences of earnings management between one period before IPO and one period after IPO? 
Research Objectives 
The objectives that the researcher wants to achieve from this thesis are: 
a. To analyze indication of earnings management conducted by companies. 
b. To analyze the differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO. 
c. To analyze the differences of earnings management between IPO and one period before IPO. 
d. To analyze the differences of earnings management between one period before IPO and one period after IPO. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency Theory 
Prior experimental research utilizes agency theory in a management accounting context and suggests that when 
there is an agency problem, managers may make operating decisions that are not in the best interest of their firms 
(Harrison and Harrell 1993; Harrell and Harrison 1994; Tuttle, Harrell, and Harrison 1997; Rutledge and Karim 
1999; Booth and Schulz 2004). In a test of the theoretical framework set forth by Kanodia, Bushman, and 
Dickhaut (1989) i.e., that both incentives and information asymmetry may help explain why managers will 
continue projects expected to become unprofitable),  
Harrell and Harrison (1994) extend the findings of their initial study by examining how the 
components of the agency problem (i.e., incentives and information asymmetry) interact to affect managers’ 
decisions to continue failing projects. The authors hypothesize that managers who experience both components 
of agency theory are more likely to continue failing projects than managers who experience incentives alone, 
information asymmetry alone, or experience neither incentives nor information asymmetry. 
Adams et al. (2006) said that the level of discretionary loan loss provisions is positively related to the 
first day returns to investors in mutuals. The  results are consistent with management of mutual thrifts benefiting 
at the conversion from reduced pre-IPO earnings and book equity resulting from earnings management. 
Therefore, managers have the incentive to minimize the value of the offer price so that directors and insiders can 
increase their proportional ownership in the firm at the lowest possible price (Adams et al., 2006). 
Carow et al.(2006) reported that initial first-day returns to investors will be increasing in the day after 
IPO and also provide evidence that managers influence the terms of the conversion offer and that greater levels 
of management participation in the offering are associated with lower offer sizes and greater initial IPO returns. 
Hypothesis Development 
In the IPO (Initial Public Offerings), a company will make the more higher earnings management because to 
attract the investor and emiten. One period after IPO (one year after IPO), the management will decrease the 
earnings management. So based on that the hypothesis purposed is: 
H1: There are differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO  
When a company makes IPO (Initial Public Offerings), the management will make more higher earnings 
management to attract the investors to invest their monies in the company. But before that, one period or one 
year before IPO done, the management will not make higher earnings management in one period before IPO 
(one year before IPO) management will decrease the earnings management. So based on that the hypothesis 
purposed is: 
H2: There are differences of earnings management between IPO and one period before IPO 
When a company makes IPO (Initial Public Offerings), management will make the more higher earnings 
management one period before IPO to attract the investors to invest their money in the company. But after that, 
one period or one year after IPO done, management will not make higher earnings management. In one period 
before IPO (one year before IPO) management will increase the earnings management rather than one period 
after IPO. So based on that the hypothesis purposed is: 
H3: There are differences of earnings management between one period before IPO and one period after IPO 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
In this research, the population is all companies that listed on IDX (Indonesian Stock Exchange) in period 2008-
2012. The sample is the company that does IPO during 2008-2012. The period before company IPO is 2007-
2011, and the period after IPO is 2009-2013. It means 1 year before and 1 year after. These companies choose 
the above years because data can be accessed. 
Source data and technique collecting data 
The data in this research is secondary data. The aim is to obtain secondary data that can be used as the basis for 
the writer in preparing thesis. In preparing the thesis, the writer also conducts the documentary data to get the 
necessary data. It is done by: Documentation. Writer collect documents relating to the data financial reporting to 
obtain the data needed to prepare thesis at www.idx.co.id. 
Operational Definition and Measurement 
a. IPO (Initial Public Offerings) is the first time a company public their stocks in the primary market. 
b. Earnings management is the act of intentionally influencing the process of financial reporting to obtain some 
private gain.  The earnings management in this research use The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
The Modified Jones Model is designed to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones Model to measure 
discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenue recognition. In the modified 
model, non-discretionary accruals are estimated during the event period (i.e., during periods in which 
earnings management is hypothesized) as follows: 
1. Calculate total accrual with the formula: 
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TAit = NIit - CFOit 
2. Calculate the value of α1, α2, α3 with Jones Model as follows: 
TAit = α1 + α2 ∆Revit + α3 PPEit + ἐit 
And then to make the same scale, all variable must be divided by A it-1 , so the formula will 
become: 
TAit/Ait-1 = α1(1/Ait-1) + α2 (∆Revit/Ait-1) + α3(PPEit/Ait-1) + ἐit 
3. Calculate NDA (Non Discretionary Accruals) with formula: 
NDAit = α1(1/Ait-1) + α2 (∆Revit/Ait-1 - ∆Recit/Ait-1) + α3(PPEit/Ait-1) + ἐit 
The value of α1, α2, α3 from the calculation in step number 2 will be get formula to NDA. 
4. Calculate DA (Discretionary Accruals) that is the indicator of earnings management with 
formula: 
DAit = TAit - NDAit 
Whereas:  
TAit = Total Accrual company i in period t 
NIit = Net Income company i in period t 
CFOit = Cash flow from operation company i in period t 
NDAit = Non Discretionary Accruals company i in period t 
DAit = Discretionary Accrual company i in period t 
Ait-1 = Total Assets company i in period t 
∆Revit = change in revenue company i in period t 
∆Recit = change in receivable company i in period t 
PPEit = Property, Plant and Equipment company i in period t 
α1, α2, α3 = coefficient regression 
ἐit = error term 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Sample in this research were IPO companies listed in BEI for period 2008-2012: 
Table 4.1. Sample Companies  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
IPO company 16 11 21 23 11 82 
The sample companies in year 2008 were 16 companies, in year 2009 were 11 companies, in year 2010 
were 21 companies, in year 2011 were 23 companies, and in year 2012 were 11 companies, so the total were 82 
companies. 
The table below shows the statistics descriptive from the data 86 data. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Time N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation 
t-1 82 -4.66 0.90 -0.0759 0.55195 
t0 82 -1.96 1.91 0.0047 0.36979 
t+1 82 -0.62 1.75 0.0209 0.28334 
From the table 4.2, the mean of variable DA (Discretionary Accrual) in t0 is 0.0047 (this means the 
companies use income increasing method in earnings management, increasing method used to make the higher 
earnings in a company to attract the investor). Income increasing means that the company make higher revenue 
and increase income.   
Meanwhile, in t-1 the value of DA was -0.0759 (this means the companies used income decreasing 
method in earnings management). Income decreasing was used to make the lower manipulation of earnings from 
a company. Income decreasing means the decreasing income rather than previous years. This means the higher 
earnings management during IPO (t0). Meanwhile, the DA (Discretionary Accrual) in t+1 is 0.0209 was higher 
than  0.0047 (t0).   
Normality Test 
Normality test used in this research was using  the Kolmogorof Smirnov test. The early data before normal is 
shown in the table below: 
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Table 4.3. Normality Test  
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
82
,0000000
,34100445
,229
,229
-,219
2,072
,000
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
Normal Parameters a,b
Absolute
Positive
Negative
Most Extreme
Differences
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
Unstandardiz
ed Residual
Test distribution is Normal.a. 
Calculated from data.b. 
 
From the tabel 4.3. the sig. Kolmogorof Smirnov is 0.000 < 0.05 so the data is not normal. So in this 
research will use Wilcoxon signed test. 
Accruals have the desirable trait of giving a summary measure of the firms accounting choice. In 
earnings management research they are usually divided into two parts, discretionary and nondiscretionary 
accruals, of which the first is the proxy for earnings management. Because discretionary accruals cannot be 
observed directly from financial statements they have to be estimated using some kind of a model. These models 
form an expectation on the nondiscretionary accruals level and the amount the actual observed accruals deviate 
from this level is assumed to be the discretionary accruals. Thus, discretionary accruals are defined as 
discretionary through the model used. Whether this is a good proxy for earnings management depends on the 
ability of the model to correctly predict how changes in business circumstances affect accruals (Spohr, 2005). 
This research will use t-test to analyze the indication of earnings management conducted by companies: 
Table 4.4. Indication Earnings Mangement t0 
One-Sample Test
2,081 81 ,041 ,06306 ,0028 ,1234t0
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 0
 
From the table, the result show the significant value is 0.041 < 0.05 so it can be concluded the 
companies do earnings management during IPO t0. 
Table 4.5. Indication Earnings Mangement t-1 
One-Sample Test
,333 81 ,740 ,00645 -,0321 ,0450t_1
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 0
 
From the table, the result show the significant value is 0.740 > 0.05 so it can be concluded the 
companies don’t do earnings management one year before IPO (t-1). 
Table 4.6. Indication Earnings Mangement t+1 
One-Sample Test
1,063 81 ,291 ,03191 -,0278 ,0916t1
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Test Value = 0
 
From the table, the result show the significant value is 0.291 > 0.05 so it can be concluded the 
companies don’t do earnings management one year after IPO (t+1). 
Hypothesis Testing 
Because of result of normality test, the data is not normal so for the hypothesis testing, Wilcoxon test. Was the  
result of Wilcoxon signed can be seen from table 4.4. 
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Table 4.7. Wilcoxon signed test (H1) 
               
Ranks
46a 39,67 1825,00
32b 39,25 1256,00
4c
82
Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total
t1 - t0
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
t1 < t0a. 
t1 > t0b. 
t1 = t0c. 
 
              
Test Statisticsb
-1,417a
,023
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
t1 - t0
Based on positive ranks.a. 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testb. 
 
This section will discuss about the result of hypothesis testing, as follows: 
H1: There are differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO 
From the Wilcoxon test result, the sig. (2-tailed)  is 0.023 < 0.05, so H1 accepted. This means  there are 
differences of earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO. 
Table 4.8.  Wilcoxon signed test  (H2) 
              
Ranks
40a 37,10 1484,00
40b 43,90 1756,00
2c
82
Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total
t0 - t_1
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
t0 < t_1a. 
t0 > t_1b. 
t0 = t_1c. 
 
                
Test Statistics b
-,652a
,514
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
t0 - t_1
Based on negative ranks.a. 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testb. 
 
H2: There are differences of earnings management between IPO and one period before IPO 
From the result, the sig. (2-tailed)  is 0.514 > 0.05, so H2 rejected. This means  there are no differences of 
earnings management between IPO and one period after IPO. 
Table 4.9.  Wilcoxon signed test  (H3) 
Ranks
40a 38,55 1542,00
40b 42,45 1698,00
2c
82
Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total
t1 - t_1
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
t1 < t_1a. 
t1 > t_1b. 
t1 = t_1c. 
 
Test Statistics b
-,374a
,708
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
t1 - t_1
Based on negative ranks.a. 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testb. 
 
H3: There are differences of earnings management between one period before IPO and one period after 
IPO, 
From the result, the sig. (2-tailed) is 0.708 > 0.05, so H3 rejected. This means  there is no differences of earnings 
management between one year before IPO and one period after IPO. 
 
Discussion  
Indication of Earnings Management Conducted by Companies 
From the t-test result, indication that companies do earnings management or not can be detected from the DA 
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(Discretionary Accruals),  the significant value is 0.041 < 0.05 so it can be concluded the companies do earnings 
management during IPO t0. Meanwhile, the significant value is 0.740 > 0.05 so it can be concluded the 
companies don’t do earnings management one year before IPO (t-1) and the significant value is 0.291 > 0.05 so 
it can be concluded the companies don’t do earnings management one year after IPO (t+1). 
 
CONCLUSION 
1. From the t-test result, indication where the companies do earnings management or not can be detected from 
the DA (Discretionary Accruals),  the significant value is 0.041 < 0.05 so it can be concluded the companies 
do earnings management during IPO t0. Meanwhile, the significant value is 0.291 > 0.05 so it can be 
concluded the companies don’t do earnings management one year before IPO (t-1) and the significant value 
is 0.740 > 0.05 so it can be concluded the companies don’t do earnings management one year after IPO 
(t+1). 
2. From the hypothesis testing, the conclusion is there are differences of earnings management between IPO 
and one period after IPO. So hypothesis is accepted. 
3. From the hypothesis testing, the conclusion is that there are no differences of earnings management between 
IPO and one period after IPO. So hypothesis rejected. 
4. From the hypothesis testing, the conclusion is that there are no differences of earnings management one 
period before IPO and one period after IPO. So the hypothesis rejected. 
Limitation 
Limitation of this research is only used the 5 - year period of sample in collecting data.  
Suggestion  
1) Based on the result, there are differences in earnings management in one period after IPO and during IPO 
because the companies make more higher earnings management during IPO  so the investors have to make a 
good selection in choosing the best alternative companies during IPO. 
2) Future research can add more variables and more samples during IPO, such as size, profitability ratio, 
solvability ratio. 
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